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Explicit Limitations on the Implicit Right to
Self-Representation in Child Sexual Abuse Trials:
Fields v. Murray
The Sixth Amendment guarantees fundamental rights to criminal
defendants during a trial,' and the United States Supreme Court has
frequently delineated the scope of the enumerated protections.2 The
Court has held, for example, that the Sixth Amendment provides for
an implicit right to self-representation.3 On the other hand, the
Court has upheld restrictions on rights of defendants that are
explicitly granted by the Confrontation Clause.4 In the case of child
sexual abuse victims, the Supreme Court has indulged the application
of state statutes that permit testimony of child witnesses outside the
presence of the defendant.' But the Court has provided little
guidance on how a trial judge should address the concerns raised
1. The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (stating that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments require state courts to provide counsel for indigent criminal
defendants); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
3. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Court held that the constitutional
right to a pro se defense is implicitly rooted in the Sixth Amendment's framework, rather
than in its plain text: "Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right
to self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily implied
by the structure of the Amendment." Id. at 819.
4. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,181-84 (1987) (holding that a co-
conspirator's out-of-court statement against the defendant was admissible because it fell
within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980)
(holding that a trial court properly admitted the pretrial testimony of a witness who was
unavailable for confrontation at trial). See generally FED. R. EVID. 801 to 806 (defining
hearsay rules for proceedings in federal courts).
5. In the landmark case of Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), the Supreme
Court concluded that the trial court properly applied a state statute that permitted the
cross-examination of a child witness outside the presence of the defendant and transmis-
sion of the testimony via one-way closed-circuit television. Id at 856-57. The statute
allowed the use of this alternative method of admitting testimony only upon a par-
ticularized showing of trauma to a child witness in a sexual abuse trial. MD. CODE ANN.,
Crs. & JuD. PROC. § 9-102 (1989).
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when a defendant invokes the right to self-representation within the
context of a child sexual abuse proceeding.6
In Fields v. Murray,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia state court decision to prevent a
defendant accused of sexually abusing children from exercising his
right to self-representation. In Fields, the Fourth Circuit stood at
the crossroads of two divergent Sixth Amendment trends. From one
direction, the court confronted the emerging practice of trial courts
granting a defendant's waiver of counsel and authorizing self-
representation.9 From the other direction, the court faced the
increasingly common use ofaltemative methods of cross-examining
alleged child sexual abuse victims," which have developed in
response to a groundswell of public concern over the protection of
child witnesses in sexual abuse trials." The Fields case demonstrates
6. For example, in In re Adoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d 653 (N.D. 1995), the
Supreme Court of North Dakota stated that "[t]here is sparse authority addressing the
propriety of limiting a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights to both self-
representation and to personally confront and cross-examine witnesses." Id. at 661.
7. 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 224 (1995).
8. Id. at 1034. The Fields Court agreed with the state trial court that the defendant
did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation. Id. Moreover,
the Fourth Circuit found that the trial court properly denied the defendant's request to
present his own defense because his sole objective was to cross-examine his accusers
personally. Id. at 1037; see infra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Fields's
defense strategy).
9. The Sixth Amendment implicitly grants a criminal defendant the right to defend
himself pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975); see infra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text. In United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295 (4th Cir. 1985), the Fourth
Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant whose request to proceed pro se was denied
by the trial court. Id. at 1299.
10. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld the
application of a state statute that permitted the use of closed-circuit television to transmit
the cross-examination of a child sexual abuse witness outside the presence of the
defendant. Id. at 857; see also Theresa Cusick, Televised Justice: Toward a New Definition
of Confrontation Under Maryland v. Craig, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 967, 967-69 (1991)
(arguing that adoption of alternative methods for questioning a child witness is designed
to promote accuracy and truthfulness in the child's testimony).
11. See generally NANCY W. PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD
WITNEss: LEGAL ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 135-38 (1991) (advocating changes in trial
procedures to alleviate trauma to child sexual abuse witnesses); Glenn Collins, Studies Find
Sexual Abuse of Children Is Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1982, at C1 (asserting that
the incarceration rate of sexual offenders is low because children rarely report the crime
or because their allegations are not believed); Sandra Evans & Robert O'Harrow, Jr.,
Young Victims of Sex Abuse Go Unheard; Civil Suits Become Increasingly Common,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 15, 1992, at B1 (describing the prosecution's difficulty in meeting the
burden of proof in a criminal trial with a single reluctant child witness).
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the difficulty in balancing such an important public concern with a
defendant's fundamental Sixth Amendment rights.2
This Note examines the Fourth Circuit's decision in Fields,
including its two-tiered analysis of Sixth Amendment protections.
After summarizing the pertinent facts and the Court's holding, 3 the
Note recounts the historical development of the implicit Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation,14 which culminated in the
case of Faretta v. California.' Next, the Note describes the emerging
trend toward restriction of Confrontation Clause rights, particularly
in sexual abuse cases. 6 Finally, the Note analyzes the reasoning in
Fields and concludes that the Fourth Circuit improperly upheld
restrictions on the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. 7
As a result, the Note concludes, the Fourth Circuit has established
precedent for further infringement of a defendant's basic entitlements
under the Sixth Amendment.
The protracted procedural history of Fields reflects the difficulty
of the legal issues raised by the case. In May 1988 Gary Fields was
charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse against his twelve-year-
old daughter and several of her friends.' 9 During the initial criminal
proceedings in the Circuit Court of Newport News, *Virginia, the trial
judge appointed two attorneys to represent Fields.' Following the
appointment of counsel, but before the trial began, Fields made three
separate requests either to act as co-counsel or to dispense with his
court-appointed counsel.2' In his correspondence with the trial
court, Fields expressed his desire to cross-examine the children who
12. The dissent in Fields recognized the inherent difficulty in conducting a sexual
abuse trial: "[E]ven individuals engaging in horrible acts are afforded protection under
our Constitution." Fields, 49 F.3d at 1037 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting).
13. See infra notes 19-47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 59-99 and accompanying text.
15. 422 U.S. 806, 819-21 (1975); see also infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text
(describing Faretta).
16. See infra notes 100-65 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 166-230 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
19. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1025-26. The prosecution alleged that Fields gave sleeping pills
to his daughter and her friends during several sleepovers at the Fields residence. Id
After the girls had been drugged, the prosecution alleged, Fields sexually abused or raped
them. Id. A grand jury charged Fields "with six counts of aggravated sexual battery, one
count of forcible sodomy, and one count of rape." Id. at 1026.
20. Id. at 1026.
21. Id. at 1026-27.
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had accused him of sexual abuse.22 After a pretrial hearing,' the
court denied all of his requests, and Fields was subsequently
convicted in a bench trial on five counts of aggravated sexual
battery.24 Claiming that the trial court denied him the right to self-
representation, Fields unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the
7 22. Id. In June 1988 Fields wrote to the trial judge, requesting permission to act as
co-counsel. Id. Although Fields expressed some reluctance to pursue this course because
of his learning disability and "limited" legal knowledge, he based his request on his intent
to question the children because" 'these kids cannot look me in the eye and lie to me.' "
Id. (emphasis added). Fields requested permission, however, to retain his court-appointed
counsel for technical legal advice. Id. at 1038 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting). In a second letter
dated August 16, 1988, Fields repeated his request to act as co-counsel and requested
replacement of his court-appointed attorneys because they resisted Fields's defense
strategy, which had " 'always been to simply get the remainder of the stories from the
witness[es] by questioning them [him]self on the stand.' " Id. at 1027. On August 29,
1988, when his request for new counsel had not been approved, Fields wrote a third letter
in which he dismissed his counsel and stated that he intended to represent himself:
"[T]he Supreme Court affirmed my right to face my accusers and I feel that that
approach is the only one that guarantees me justice. I heard perjury committed
at the hearing and I believe the witnesses would not hesitate to lie again to a
stranger. The stranger I am referring to would be any council [sic] asking them
questions .... I regret putting you in this position your Honor but my future is
my responsibility and no one else[']s. My honor and reputation is my respon-
sibility and no one else['Js. Without the opportunity to personally defend myself
justice wvill not be served."
Id. at 1039 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
23. At the hearing, the trial judge questioned Fields about his reasons for dismissing
his counsel and his competence to conduct his own defense:
THE COURT: You haven't got a legal degree have you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Don't you think these two attorneys are better suited for what
ought to be brought up on your case and what ought not to be brought up?
THE DEFENDANT: In some respects.
THE COURT: You can forget about my allowing you to cross-examine these
complaining witnesses-these young children. I'm not going to allow that
under any circumstance.
THE DEFENDANT: Well then, there won't be any justice in this courtroom.
Id at 1039-40 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting). Later in the dialogue, Fields claimed that the
United States Supreme Court had recognized a defendant's right to cross-examine his
accusers. Id. at 1040 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting). The judge responded, " 'Well, I'm the
Supreme Court in your trial, and you're not going to cross-examine those children. You can
write out your questions and give it to your lawyers if you want to do that.., but you're
not going to stand up here and cross-examine your accusers.' " Id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
The trial judge hinted at his reasoning when he stated, " 'I can't think of putting a child
any more ill at ease than to have her own defendant father who she's accused of sexually
abusing her standing up here and questioning her.' " Id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1028. The Fourth Circuit panel opinion reported that "Fields was ...
sentenced to eleven years' imprisonment on condition of five years' probation and ten
years' good behavior." Fields v. Murray, No. 91-7169, 1994 WL 63013, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar.
3, 1994) (panel decision), vacated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9711, at *1 (4th Cir. May 3,
1994).
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Virginia Court of Appeals' and to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia.26
In February 1991 Fields petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia.' A magistrate judge denied the writ, holding that the trial
court had not abused its discretion.' Subsequently, a district court
judge accepted the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals and
denied the petition. 9 Fields appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which initially reversed the district
court and ordered that the writ be granted3 0 However, upon
rehearing en banc,3' the Fourth Circuit vacated the panel decision
3 2
and affirmed the district court's denial of the writ?3
25. In an unpublished opinion, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the trial court
properly denied Fields's request to dismiss counsel and proceed pro se because " 'the
record ... contains no clear and unequivocal waiver of counsel. To the contrary, the
record shows that [Fields] wanted and repeatedly requested permission only to conduct
cross-examination.' " Fields, 49 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Fields v. Commonwealth, No. 1697-
88-1, slip op. at 3 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1990)).
26. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Fields's petition for review. Fields v.
Commonwealth, No. 901282 (Va. Nov. 26, 1990). Under Virginia law, a Supreme Court
denial of petition for appeal operates as a ruling on the merits. See Saunders v. Reynolds,
204 S.E.2d 421, 424-25 (Va. 1974).
27. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1028.
28. Fields v. Murray, No. 91-100-N, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21142, at *8-9 (E.D. Va.
June 10, 1991) ("Fields' letters and verbal communications taken as a whole do not
manifest an 'unequivocal demand for self-representation.' " (quoting Walker v. Loggins,
608 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1979)).
29. Fields v. Murray, No. 91-100-N, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21140, at *2 (E.D. Va. July
10, 1991) ("[Tlhe Magistrate Judge's analyses of the facts and law [were] correct.").
30. Fields v. Murray, No. 91-7169, 1994 WL 63013, at *8 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 1994),
vacated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9711, at *1 (4th Cir. May 3, 1994). The panel decision,
authored by Chief Judge Ervin (author of the dissent in the en bane decision), considered
de novo the issue of Fields's invocation of the right to self-representation:
In our view, [the third letter written by Fields] reflects Fields' clear and
unequivocal invocation of his right to self-representation and his simultaneous
waiver of the right to counsel .... That ... cross-examination was Fields' sole
motivation for seeking to represent himself does not eviscerate his unequivocal
invocation of his Faretta right.
Id at *4-5.
31. According to the dissent in Fields, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case en bane
in order to produce Part III of the majority's opinion, in which the court held that
restriction of the right to face-to-face confrontation with witnesses justified limitations on
a defendant's right to self-representation. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1044 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting);
see infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
32. See Fields v. Murray, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9711, at *1 (4th Cir. May 3, 1994)
(panel decision), vacated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9711, at *1 (4th Cir. May 3, 1994).
33. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1025 (7-5 vote). Appointed counsel represented Fields
throughout the appellate proceedings. See Fields v. Murray, No. 91-7169, 1994 WL 63013,
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The majority opinion in Fields presented two independent
inquiries into the trial court proceedings. First, in adopting the
conclusions of the district court,34 the Fourth Circuit held that Fields
did not unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation."
Under the majority's analysis, Fields's sole request to defend himself
pro se was based on his desire for a face-to-face confrontation with
his accusers. 6 The majority further observed that Fields may have
wavered in his desire for self-representation because he expressed
"regret" over his decision to dismiss his counsel. 7 Overall, the
majority concluded that "[tihe record taken as a whole, therefore,
discloses only a single statement in one letter from Fields that perhaps
indicated a desire to proceed pro se, although it is not entirely clear
that Fields intended it as such."38
In its second inquiry, the majority determined that even if Fields
effectively invoked his right to proceed pro se, the trial court's denial
of his request was proper because the court could reject his stated
purpose of self-representation: to cross-examine the girls personal-
ly.39 By analogy to the 1990 case of Maryland v. Craig,40 in which
at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 1994) (panel decision), vacated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9711, at *1
(4th Cir. May 3, 1994).
34. The majority opinion, written by Judge Russell, concluded that the issue of
whether a defendant effectively invoked his right to self-representation is a question of fact
and, therefore, the state court's ruling was reviewable under the "presumption of
correctness" contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Fields, 49 F.3d at 1032. The majority
concluded that "[b]ecause we cannot conclude that [the trial court decision] lacked even
fair support in the record, the state court's finding that Fields failed to invoke his right to
self-representation clearly and unequivocally must be upheld." Id. at 1034. Conversely,
the dissent argued that "[w]hether [the facts in the trial record] disclose a clear and
unequivocal intention by Fields sufficient to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to waive
the right to counsel and proceed pro se is a question of law, not a question of fact." Id.
at 1042 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
35. Unlike the right to counsel, which need not be asserted to be effective, the Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation is effective only when a defendant "knowingly and
intelligently" declares to the court that he intends to represent himself. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
36. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1033. The majority observed that Fields did not discuss
proceeding as a pro se defendant until his third letter to the trial judge, but the text of the
letter "suggest[ed] that he may have been thinking about simply cross-examining
personally the witnesses against him, rather than proceeding pro se." dL
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1034. The majority argued that in his brief presented to the Fourth Circuit,
Fields conceded that his sole purpose for proceeding pro se was to cross-examine his
accusers personally. Id. Fields argued that "[h]e demanded to represent himself so that
he could personally cross-examine the witnesses and thus control the presentation of his




the United States Supreme Court upheld modified procedures for
receiving the testimony of child sexual abuse victims against the
accused,41 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Sixth Amendment
did not guarantee Fields a constitutional right to cross-examine the
girls personally.42 The Fourth Circuit adopted Craig's two-pronged
test to determine whether courts can prohibit a pro se defendant from
confronting adverse witnesses face-to-face.43  First, the court
reasoned that the purpose of the self-representation right-to affirm
the dignity and autonomy of the defendant-could be "otherwise
assured" even when one element of the right-personal cross-
examination of witnesses-is restricted." Second, relying on the
Craig decision,45 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the important
state interest of preventing emotional trauma to the child witnesses
outweighed Fields's right to personal cross-examination.46 Conse-
40. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
41. In Craig, the testimony of a child sexual abuse victim was taken outside the
courtroom and transmitted live via closed-circuit television to the judge, jury, and
defendant. Id. at 840-43.
42. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1034-37. The Craig Court found that the reliability of the
testimony of child sexual abuse witnesses admitted via closed-circuit television is
"functionally equivalent" to physical confrontation as long as the trial court enforces other
"safeguards of reliability and adversariness," including the oath, cross-examination, and
observation of the witness by the trier of fact. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851.
43. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1035. Under Craig, a defendant's right to face-to-face meeting
with his accusers under the Confrontation Clause can be restricted "only where denial of
such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
44. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1035-37. The majority stated that "it is universally recognized
that the self-representation right is not absolute." Ild. at 1035. The court then applied the
Craig analysis to Fields's right to self-representation: The purposes of the right to self-
representation, "to affirm [a defendant's] 'dignity and autonomy' " and to present his
" 'best possible defense,' " could be assured even if Fields could not personally cross-
examine the witnesses. ld. at 1035 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-78
(1984)). Hence, the Fields court concluded that denial of the request to cross-examine the
witnesses did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation established in
Faretta. IL at 1035-37.
45. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853-55. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Craig Court, stated
that the enactment of "child shield" statutes in over 30 states demonstrated the importance
of protecting child witnesses. Id at 853.
46. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036. Although Craig required a particularized showing of
trauma to the child witnesses, 497 U.S. at 855-58, the majority in Fields found it
"reasonable for the trial court to have concluded on the basis of the facts before it that
[the child victims] would be emotionally harmed if they were personally cross-examined
in open court by Fields, their alleged abuser," Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036, Unlike Craig, the
record in Fields contained no expert testimony or other evidence demonstrating the
likelihood of trauma to the children. Id. Nonetheless, the Fields court reasoned: "[W]e
do not believe it was essential in this case that psychological evidence of the probable
emotional harm to each of the girls be presented in order for the trial court to find that
1996]
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quently, the majority concluded that "[b]ecause the trial court was not
required to allow such personal cross-examination, Fields was denied
nothing to which he was entitled."'47
The Fields dissent, written by Chief Judge Ervin, rejected both
parts of the majority opinion.4' First, the dissent argued that in his
third letter to the court and at the pretrial hearing, Fields waived his
right to counsel and effectively invoked his right to self-represen-
tation.49  Rejecting the majority's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment provisions, the dissent asserted that "[t]he right to
represent oneself before a jury of one's peers is the bedrock of the
Sixth Amendment."50 Subordination of the self-representation right
to the public policy of protecting child witnesses thus violated the
holding in Faretta.5 '
Second, the dissent rejected the majority's analogy to Maryland
v. Craig.52 According to the dissent, Craig addressed "the 'accuracy'
and 'reliability' concerns that form the core of Confrontation Clause
analysis";53 the holding in Craig, however, did not encompass the pro
se defendant's "dignity and autonomy," which are protected by the
Faretta right to self-representation. 4  Instead of deciding Fields
solely by analogizing it to Craig, Chief Judge Ervin's dissent argued
that both Craig and Faretta could be satisfied by allowing the use of
modified courtroom procedures during the defendant's cross-
examination of the child witnesses.'
Overall, the court's decision in Fields suggests that the Fourth
Circuit remains deeply divided56 over the protection of two impor-
denying Fields personal cross-examination was necessary to protect them." Id. at 1037.
47. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1034.
48. Id. at 1037 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1044 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
51. See id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Ervin attacked the protective stance
adopted by the majority, claiming that it disregarded the defendant's constitutional right:
"I am afraid that in trying to protect these children, a majority of this court also closed its
eyes to Fields' invocation of his right to represent himself." Id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1044-47 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting); see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying
text.
53. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1047 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). The dissent proposed several alternatives to face-to-
face cross-examination, such as "installing a screen or other barrier between the defendant
and the witnesses; conducting closed sessions out of the courtroom; placing the defendant
and the witnesses in separate rooms.., and requiring the defendant to remain seated at
counsel table while questioning the witnesses." Id. at 1047 n.4 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
56. The vote in the en banc decision was 7-5. Id. at 1025.
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tant legal interests: a defendant's right to self-representation and the
protection of child witnesses in sexual abuse trials. In the Fourth
Circuit's view, the implicit Sixth Amendment right to a pro se defense
may be subjected to the same judicial scrutiny that the Supreme Court
has imposed on the explicit rights of the Confrontation Clause."
Despite the contentious debate between the majority and dissent in
Fields, the opinion sets a precedent for the limitation of self-represen-
tation rights when the restriction is necessary to advance an important
public policy.5"
During the past seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has
examined the breadth of the constitutional right of representation
under the Sixth Amendment. The Court has held that a trial court
must grant a defendant the right to counsel before it can impose a
valid conviction or imprisonment.59 The Sixth Amendment does not,
however, explicitly confer on a criminal defendant the right to self-
representation.' The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted defendants in
federal courts the right to proceed pro se.61 Similarly, several state
constitutions explicitly grant to the criminal defendant the right of
defending himself personally.6 However, the Supreme Court has
examined the right to self-representation in only a limited number of
cases.
63
57. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (summarizing the Fields majority's
application of the Craig analysis).
58. See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (concluding that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require appointment of counsel for indigent criminal
defendants in state court trials); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) (stating
that the Sixth Amendment is a "jurisdictional bar" to a criminal conviction in federal court
when counsel is not retained or provided); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73 (1932)
(holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required appointment of counsel for
a criminal defendant in a capital case who was unable to retain an attorney and was
incapable of representing himself).
60. See supra note 1.
61. This portion of the Judiciary Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1988).
62. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1897 art. I, § 7 (declaring that a criminal defendant has
the right "to be heard by himself and his counsel"); MASS. CONST. art. XII (providing that
a criminal defendant has the right "to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or by
counsel, at his election"); S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 14 (guaranteeing a defendant's right "to be
fully heard in his defense by himself or by his counsel or by both"). The Constitution of
Virginia does not explicitly grant the right to self-representation or assistance of counsel,
but the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the Bill of Rights in the United States
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Watkins v. Common-
wealth, 6 S.E.2d 670, 671 (Va. 1940).
63. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment implicitly guarantees the freedom to represent oneself); Price v. Johnston, 334
U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (holding that a defendant has the "privilege of conducting his own
1996]
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In 1943, the Supreme Court decided Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann,64 in which it considered whether a defendant could
waive his right to a jury trial without the advice of counsel.65 In
Adams, the Court examined the benefits of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and a defendant's freedom to present his own
defense.6 While concluding that the defendant may freely choose
to waive the right to a hearing in front of a jury,67 the Court's
opinion examined in dicta "[t]he right to assistance of counsel and the
correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help."'  According to
the Adams Court, "[a]n accused must have the means of presenting
his best defense,, 69 and "the public conscience must be satisfied that
fairness dominates the administration of justice."'7  Most impor-
tantly, Adams concluded that "the Constitution does not force a
lawyer upon a defendant."'"
After Adams, the issue of whether a state, in the interest of
protecting the right to counsel, could constitutionally compel a
defendant to accept counsel remained unanswered.72 In 1975,
however, the United States Supreme Court resolved the debate over
pro se litigation in the definitive case of Faretta v. California.73 In
Faretta, a criminal defendant requested permission to represent
himself in a California state court, and the trial judge granted the
request.74 Just before trial, however, the trial judge, concerned
defense at the trial"); Adams v. United States ex reL McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)
(holding that the Constitution cannot force a lawyer upon a defendant); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant's right to be present at all portions of his
trial as required by fundamental fairness because the defendant ultimately has the right
to conduct his own defense).
64. 317 U.S. 269 (1943).
65. Id. at 270-72.
66. 1d, at 275-81.
67. Id. at 280-81. The Adams Court stated that the denial of a defendant's reasonable
request for waiver of a jury trial "imprison[s] a man in his privileges." Id. at 280.
68. Id, at 279-80.
69. Id. at 279. The Court rejected a formalistic approach to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel: "[T]he procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights are not to be treated
as mechanical rigidities. What were contrived as protections for the accused should not
be turned into fetters." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Recognition of a right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment is
dispositive of the rights of defendants in state courts due to the protections granted under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
73. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
74. Id. at 807-08.
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about the defendant's ignorance of the rules of evidence and jury
selection, reversed his ruling and appointed the public defender to
serve as counsel.75 The defendant was convicted, and the California
Court of Appeal affirmed.76
In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court held that a state
court cannot force appointed counsel on an unwilling criminal
defendant: "The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for
it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."77 The
Faretta opinion, written by Justice Stewart, stated that the explicit
Sixth Amendment rights of notice, confrontation, and compulsory
process are rooted in an implicit right to self-representation;7 8 hence,
the Court concluded that "forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling
defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly
wants to do so."" Because the defendant in Faretta "clearly and
unequivocally" declared his intention to discharge his counsel and
represent himselft ° the Supreme Court held that the trial court
violated his Sixth Amendment right." The Faretta majority, which
acknowledged that the loss of any "benefits" associated with the right
to counsel could lead to unfavorable consequences for the defen-
75. Id at 808-10.
76. d at 811-12. The California Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for
review. Id. at 812.
77. Id. at 819-20. The Court stated that the explicit Sixth Amendment guarantee of
counsel must be provided in the form of assistance. Id. at 820. In cases in which counsel
is "thrust" upon an unwilling defendant, the counsel becomes "not an assistant, but a
master." Id.
78. I& at 818-19. The Court concluded that "the Sixth Amendment does not provide
merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally
the right to make his defense." Id. at 819. The Court acknowledged a "consensus"
recognition of the right to self-representation among the state constitutions, federal court
decisions, and Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 817. According to Faretta, the consensus
is rooted in "the structure of the Sixth Amendment, as well as in the English and colonial
jurisprudence from which the Amendment emerged." Id. at 818. The Faretta opinion
traced the history of the right of self-representation from early common law, during which
a criminal defendant usually presented his own defense, through the Revolutionary period,
when self-representation was protected through colonial charters and state laws. Id at
821-32.
79. Id. at 817.
80. Id. at 835. The defendant's declaration indicated that he "knowingly and
intelligently" relinquished the right to be represented by counsel. Id The "knowingly and
intelligently" standard, announced by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464-65
(1938), has commonly been adopted by modern courts in their review of defendants'
requests for self-representation. See infra note 87.
81. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.
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dant, 2 ruled that a defendant seeking to proceed pro se must
"knowingly and intelligently" waive his right to counsel.8 3
In his dissent in Faretta, Chief Justice Burger argued that
enforcement of the implicit right to self-representation would
inevitably compromise the explicit rights granted under the Sixth
Amendment. 4 Chief Justice Burger asserted that the "spirit and the
logic" of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant "the fullest
possible defense," which is ultimately best effected by granting broad
discretionary powers to the trial judge "to determine whether the
accused is capable of conducting his defense."85
In the aftermath of Faretta, lower courts have attempted to
properly scrutinize defendants' decisions to travel the road of self-
representation. 6 Like many of the other federal appellate courts,87
82. Id. at 834.
83. IcL at 835 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65). The Faretta Court attempted to
reconcile its decision with previous Supreme Court cases that prohibited conviction or
imprisonment of defendants without provision of the right to assistance of counsel. Id. at
832-34; see supra note 59. The Court concluded that the Bill of Rights does not extinguish
a defendant's free choice, including his decision whether the assistance of counsel is
advantageous to his defense. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34.
84. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 837 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent argued that "in all
but an extraordinarily small number of cases an accused will lose whatever defense he may
have if he undertakes to conduct the trial himself." Id. at 838 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger rejected the majority's argument that the defendant bears primary
responsibility for his defense. Id. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Instead, he argued that
the prosecution and the trial judge have a duty to ensure that justice is served: "[T]he
system of criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction."
Id. at 838, 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger's paradigm of a helpless
defendant representing himself came to life in the case of Colin Ferguson, who was
convicted in February 1995 of six counts of second-degree murder and nineteen counts of
attempted murder after a shooting rampage on a New York commuter train. See John T.
McQuiston, Jury Finds Ferguson Guilty of Slayings on the L.LR.R., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1995, at Al. After discharging two attorneys who had encouraged him to pursue insanity
and "black rage" defenses, Ferguson conducted his own defense, which included cross-
examination of witnesses and opening and closing statements. Id. at A26. Ferguson had
been diagnosed as paranoid and delusional. See John T. McQuiston, Murder Trial in
L.LR.R. Case Goes to the Jury for Deliberation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at B1.
85. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the
powers of discretion retained by the trial court are essential to protect "[t]rue freedom of
choice and society's interest in seeing that justice is achieved." Id. (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The majority conceded that a pro se defendant may ultimately injure himself,
but stated that "[a defendant's] choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' " Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). In Fields, the Fourth Circuit rejected
the defendant's claim for self-representation in order to protect child witnesses, rather than
to protect the defendant from adverse consequences at trial. 49 F.3d at 1037.




the Fourth Circuit has established criteria for determining if a
defendant has effectively waived her right to counsel and invoked her
right to self-representation. In McNamara v. Riddle,88 the court
adopted the Tenth Circuit standard that the right to a pro se defense
is in force only when a defendant asserts it "clearly and unequivocal-
ly."'8 9  In the 1985 case of United States v. Lorick," the Fourth
Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant who was forced to
accept court-appointed counsel even though he had "expressly and
unambiguously" requested to proceed pro se.9' 7he Lorick court
urged that a trial judge faced with an ambivalent defendant should
"elicit for the record a clear statement indicating a defendant's
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so, when must
that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and the right to
self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each right to be
measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se,
does he still have a constitutional right to assistance of standby counsel? How
soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by
counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May a violation
of the right to self-representation ever be harmless error? Must the trial court
treat the pro se defendant differently than it would professional counsel?
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Fields, the Fourth Circuit examined
the difficulties encountered by a trial court when a defendant intends to invoke the right
of self-representation, concluding that the trial court must navigate a "thin line" along
which it protects both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. Fields, 49
F.3d at 1029. For example, improperly allowing the defendant to represent himself may
violate the right to counsel, while improperly requiring retention of counsel may violate
the right to self-representation. Id For a survey of contemporary Sixth Amendment law,
see Rick Madden & Cheryl M. Miller, Project, Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J.
1007, 1014-18 (1994).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504,1510 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that "[w]aiver of the right to counsel must be made 'knowingly and intelligently' and
'made with eyes open' as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"); Adams
v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that request for self-
representation must be unequivocal, knowing and intelligent, timely, and not for purposes
of delay).
88. 563 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the defendant's "implied" request
for self-representation did not satisfy the Faretta standard for invoking the right to proceed
pro se).
89. Id at 127 (citing United States v. Bennett, 539 U.S. 45,50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1976)).
90. 753 F.2d 1295 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1107 (1985).
91. Id. at 1299. In Lorick, the defendant effectively invoked his right to self-
representation, but subsequently invited standby counsel to participate in pretrial
proceedings. Id. at 1298. At trial, the standby counsel became more involved in the
defense, and the court required the defendant to address the court through his attorney.
Id. at 1299. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the defendant never waived his right to
self-representation once he invoked it. Id.
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knowledgeable initial assertion of the right [of self-representation] and
thereafter to observe the right scrupulously."92 Finally, in United
States v. Gillis,93 the Fourth Circuit stated that the right to self-
representation "can only be invoked by waiving counsel expressly,
knowingly, and intelligently."94
In the 1984 case of McKaskle v. Wiggins,95 the Supreme Court
enumerated the specific rights of a defendant who successfully invokes
his right to self-representation: "The pro se defendant must be
allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense,
to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to
question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at ap-
propriate points in the trial."96 The Wiggins Court resolved a case
in which a defendant had asserted his right as a pro se litigant, but the
trial court assigned standby counsel whose behavior at trial interfered
with the defendant's actions.97  The Supreme Court ultimately
upheld the defendant's conviction because the standby counsel's
behavior did not violate the right to self-representation.98 The Court
further stated that the Faretta doctrine does not provide a
constitutional guarantee for "hybrid" representation, such as
appointment of standby counsel or the defendant's involvement as co-
counsel.99
Along with its recognition of an implicit right to self-represen-
tation, the Supreme Court has examined the explicit provisions of the
Sixth Amendment that provide guarantees to the defendant simply by
virtue of his presence at trial. In the case of the Confrontation
Clause,1" the Court's decisions reveal a discernible trend toward
restricting face-to-face meetings between a defendant and the
92. Id. at 1299.
93. 773 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 559.
95. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
96. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). The Wiggins Court also stated that "[tihe right to
appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the
presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused's best possible defense."
Id. at 176-77.
97. Id. at 172-73.
98. Id. at 188.
99. Id. at 183; see also Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (11th Cir.)
(holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to "hybrid" representation and that
"the decision to permit a defendant to proceed as co-counsel rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990).
100. The Constitution provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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witnesses testifying against him. 1' The Fourth Circuit's decision in
Fields relied extensively on the Supreme Court's recent Confrontation
Clause opinions.' °2
Historically, the absence of early Supreme Court decisions on the
Confrontation Clause was an "understandable consequence of the
scant attention originally paid to the Bill of Rights and the limited
criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts early in the nation's
history."'" The Court's first major analysis of the Confrontation
Clause occurred in the 1895 case of Mattox v. United States.'04 In
Mattox, the Court addressed the admissibility of transcribed testimony
of witnesses taken at the defendant's previous trial. 5 The trial
court had admitted the testimony taken from the prior case, and the
defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the admission
of the testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation
Clause.10 6 In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Court declared
that "the primary object of the constitutional provision in question
was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-
examination of the witness.' '107 Mattox held that the Confrontation
Clause was satisfied when the defendant had been granted a face-to-
face confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses in the first
trial.08 The Court thus rejected a literal interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment," 9 instead holding that the "general rule" requiring the
101. See, eg., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-52 (1990) (holding that testimony
of a child sexual abuse -witness may be taken outside the presence of the defendant and
transmitted to the trial court through closed-circuit television); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 74-75 (1980) (admitting pretrial statements of witnesses who were unavailable at trial).
102. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (analyzing the impact of Maryland
v. Craig on the Fields holding).
103. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 589 (1992).
104. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
105. ld. at 240. Because the witnesses had died after the first trial, they were no longer
available for cross-examination or impeachment. Id. at 245. The trial court also refused
to allow the defendant to introduce a witness to impeach the testimony of one of the
deceased witnesses. Id. at 244-45. The Mattox Court held that "before a witness can be
impeached [by evidence of contradictory statements], a foundation must be laid by
interrogating the witness himself as to whether he has ever made such statements." Id.
Hence, a witness could not be impeached after his death. Id. at 245-50.
106. Id at 238-39.
107. Id. at 242-43.
108. Id. at 244.
109. Id. at 243. The Mattox Court warned of the extreme consequences of a literal
interpretation: "A technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may
occasionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and
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presence of witnesses before the jury "must occasionally give way to
the considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case."
110
For nearly a century after Mattox, the Supreme Court's principal
Confrontation Clause decisions centered on the evidentiary question
of hearsay exceptions."' In several of its opinions, the Court
ostensibly balanced the "integrity of the fact-finding process" ' with
the utility of allowing exceptions to in-court, physical confron-
tation.' The Court's treatment of the Confrontation Clause
culminated in the 1980 case of Ohio v. Roberts,"' in which the
Court enunciated a standard for allowing exceptions to the confron-
tation right."5 In Roberts, a witness testified during a preliminary
hearing against a defendant charged with forgery."6 In preparation
for trial, the prosecution subpoenaed the witness five times, but she
could not be located."7 Over the defendant's objection, the
prosecution successfully introduced a transcript of the testimony from
the hearing, and the defendant was convicted on all counts."' After
farther than the safety of the public will warrant." Id.
110. Id
111. Compare, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970) (allowing a trial court
to admit a prior inconsistent statement by a witness for substantive purposes because the
prior testimony was subject to cross-examination by the defendant) and Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (holding that the admission of testimony taken at a
preliminary hearing from a witness who was unavailable at trial due to negligence of the
prosecution violated the Confrontation Clause, even though the defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness) with Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)
(concluding that physical confrontation of an available witness who made a prior
implicating statement was unnecessary because cross-examination of a second witness who
heard the statement would satisfy the "truth-determining process" guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause). See generally Jacqueline M. Beckett, The True Value of the
Confrontation Clause: A Study of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1614-29
(1994) (criticizing Supreme Court precedent that equates the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation with cross-examination); Berger, supra note 103, at 592 (arguing that the
widespread acceptance of Professor Wigmore's theory of pre-constitutional hearsay
exceptions "laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court's present view of confrontation
as an evidentiary doctrine").
112. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969).
113. See, eg., Green, 399 U.S. at 165 (holding that a witness's forgetfulness at trial
permitted the prosecution to introduce statements by the witness taken during a
preliminary hearing in which the defendant's counsel was present and had the opportunity
to cross-examine the witness).
114. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
115. Id at 65, 73-77.
116. Id. at 58.
117. Id at 59.




his conviction, the defendant appealed, claiming violation of his right
to confrontation. 9
The Roberts Court employed a two-part analysis for evaluating
hearsay in light of "the Framers' preference for face-to-face ac-
cusation."'" First, introduction of the hearsay must satisfy the rule
of necessity, under which the proponent of the evidence must
demonstrate the unavailability of the witness. 1  Second, the
statement "is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability.' "" According to Roberts, the reliability of the
statement can be readily inferred if it "falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception";"z otherwise, the proponent must present "a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."'24 Overall,
the Roberts Court rejected a strict interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause; instead, the Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment
requires " 'substantial compliance with the purposes behind the
confrontation requirement.' ""n
The Roberts decision provided a framework for courts to use in
determining whether to dispense with physical confrontation of
witnesses in particular cases. During the 1980s, however, new
challenges to the confrontation right emerged.Y In particular, the
119. Md at 59, 62.
120. Id. at 65.
121. I. The Court declared that absolute unavailability of a witness is not necessary
in order to dispense with physical confrontation: "The ultimate question is whether the
witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and
present that witness." Id. at 74.
122. 1I at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
123. Id. In Roberts, the Court held that the defense attorney's opportunity to question
the witness and his use of leading questions at the preliminary hearing took the form of
cross-examination; hence, the testimony satisfied the right to confrontation and its
reliability requirement. Id. at 70-73; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970)
(holding that testimony under oath, assistance of counsel, the opportunity to cross-
examine, and proceeding in a court sufficiently simulate trial conditions and satisfy the
confrontation right).
124. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
125. Id at 69 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 166).
126. After the Roberts decision was handed down in 1980, the Supreme Court further
examined the constitutional issues surrounding the hearsay rules. See, e.g., White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,353-58 (1992) (holding that the Confrontation Clause did not require
a showing of unavailability of a declarant whose statements fell within the state's hearsay
exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of receiving
medical care); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-19 (1990) (declaring that the state's
residual hearsay exception was not a "firmly rooted" exception, and therefore statements
falling within it were admissible only upon a finding of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness"); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987) (concluding that
out-of-court declarations made by a co-conspirator fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay
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growing public awareness of child sexual abuse and the difficulties of
gathering sufficient evidence for criminal convictions"z prompted
the development of nontraditional methods of gathering evidence and
admitting testimony."2  In response to the public outcry for
prosecution of child abusers, many states enacted child shield statutes
which explicitly permit courts to adopt alternative methods for
receiving the testimony of children in sexual abuse cases." 9 Many
exception and hence the trial court was not required to examine independently the
reliability of the statements); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,394-400 (1986) (holding
that a showing of the unavailability of the declarant was not required for the trial court
to admit a co-conspirator's out-of-court statements). See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 252 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
127. The number of reported cases of child sexual abuse grew dramatically from 1975
to 1990. GAIL S. GOODMAN ET AL., TESTIFYING IN CRIMINAL COURT. EMOTIONAL
EFFECrS ON CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS 1-2 (1992). One study found that the
number of reported cases increased from 1,975 to over 135,000 between 1976 and 1990.
Id. (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM WORKING PAPER: 1990 SUMMARY COMPONENTS
(1992)). Child sexual abuse cases are difficult to prosecute for several reasons, including
the scarcity and unreliability of evidence. See Meridith F. Sopher, "The Best of All
Possible Worlds": Balancing Victims' and Defendants' Rights in the Child Sexual Abuse
Case, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 643 (1994). In many cases, the lack of physical evidence
means that the prosecution hinges on the testimony of the child victim. Id. at 644. The
problem is compounded by factors that may limit the child's ability to communicate
effectively, including intimidation by the courtroom setting and memory loss. Id. at 643-44.
According to one study sponsored by the Department of Justice, children have difficulty
testifying for three principal reasons: immaturity, the nature of the crime of sexual abuse,
and the criminal justice system's "limited understanding of children's capabilities as
witnesses." DEBRA WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 15 (2d ed. 1992).
128. Courts have adopted several techniques to facilitate child sexual abuse
prosecutions, including "admitting psychological expert testimony, ... abolishing
corroboration requirements, and extending statutes of limitations." Diana Younts,
Evaluating and Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,
41 DUKE L.J. 691, 694 (1991).
129. See, eg., MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (1995) (permitting use of
one-way closed-circuit television to transmit the cross-examination of a child witness
conducted outside the presence of the defendant); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law.
Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994) (allowing use of videotaped testimony by child witness); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994) (permitting the use of two-way closed
circuit television for cross-examination outside the defendant's presence). For a complete
list of statutes permitting the use of videotaped testimony, one-way closed circuit
television, and two-way closed circuit television, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853-
54 nn. 2-4 (1990). At the time of the Fields trial, Virginia law allowed an alternative
method of testimony in sexual assault cases:
A. In any criminal proceeding, including preliminary hearings, involving an
alleged offense against a child the age of twelve or under relating to [several
crimes including sexual assault] .... the Commonwealth's attorney or the
defendant may apply for an order from the court that the child's testimony
be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised by two-way
closed-circuit television ....
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states enacted statutes that did not require a particular finding of
unavailability under the Roberts framework but instead presumed that
there would be trauma to all child witnesses in these cases. 30
Hence, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to renew its scrutiny
of challenges to the Confrontation Clause.
In 1988, the Court examined the constitutionality of a child shield
statute in Coy v. Iowa.3 The defendant in Coy was charged with
sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls.1 32 Pursuant to a state
statute,33 the trial court allowed the girls to testify behind a screen
that prevented the girls from seeing the defendant yet "would enable
[the defendant] dimly to perceive the witness."'n The Supreme
Court held that the use of the screen violated the Confrontation
B. The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken [under
Subsection A] if it finds that the child is unavailable to testify in open court
in the presence of the defendant, the jury, the judge, and the public, for any
of the following reasons:
1. The child's persistent refusal to testify despite judicial requests to do so;
2. The child's substantial inability to communicate about the offense; or
3. The substantial likelihood, based upon expert opinion testimony, that
the child will suffer severe emotional trauma from so testifying.
C. In any proceeding in which closed-circuit television is used to receive
testimony, the Commonwealth's attorney and the defendant's attorney shall
be present in the room with the child, and the child shall be subject to direct
and cross-examination. The only other persons allowed to be present in the
room with the child during his testimony shall be those persons necessary to
operate the closed-circuit equipment, and any other person whose presence
is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of
the child.
D. The child's testimony shall be transmitted by closed-circuit television into the
courtroom for the defendant, jury, judge and public to view. The defendant
shall be provided with a means of private, contemporaneous communication
with his attorney during the testimony.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988).
North Carolina has not enacted a child shield statute, yet trial courts have authorized
the use of closed-circuit television to transmit the testimony of child witnesses taken
outside the presence of a criminal defendant. See, e.g., In re Stradford, 119 N.C. App. 654,
657-59, 460 S.E.2d 173, 175-76 (holding that the trial court's discretionary use of remote
testimony did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation under the North Carolina
or federal constitutions), disc rev. denied, 341 N.C. 650, 462 S.E.2d 525 (1995).
130. See Cusick, supra note 10, at 975 (listing the states with such statues).
131. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
132. Id. at 1014.
133. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987) (repealed 1989). The statute allowed the child
witness to testify in "an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the
[defendant] to see and hear the child" while preventing the child from seeing or hearing
the defendant. Id.
134. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015.
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Clause,135 which "guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting
with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." '36 Writing for the
Court, Justice Scalia asserted that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a more
obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-
face encounter."'37
The Coy opinion observed that previous Supreme Court decisions
permitting limitations on the right to physical confrontation dealt with
rights that are implicit in the Confrontation Clause;'38 hence, the
Coy Court conceded that these rights "are not absolute, and may give
way to other important interests." '139 In contrast, the defendant's
right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses at trial was "narrowly
and explicitly set forth in the [Confrontation] Clause."'" The Court
also rejected the state's contention that the statute was necessary to
further the important public policy of preventing trauma to witnes-
ses.
141
Justice O'Connor, concurring, agreed that the statute in Coy did
not qualify as an exception to the Confrontation Clause; but she
argued that the majority did not abolish all child shield statutes. 4 1
Moreover, Justice O'Connor asserted that precedent clearly permitted
limited exceptions to the "core" Confrontation Clause protections.143
Alluding to the enactment of numerous child shield statutes by state
legislatures, Justice O'Connor concluded that "the protection of child
witnesses" is an important public policy that could, under certain
circumstances, justify limitation of the Confrontation Clause."44
135. Id. at 1022.
136. Id at 1016.
137. Id. at 1020.
138. Id.; see, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65, 77 (1980) (holding that the
defendant could not exclude out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness).
139. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1021. Noting that the Iowa statute "create[d] a legislatively imposed
presumption of trauma," the Court held that the denial of face-to-face confrontation could
not withstand the explicit guarantees of the Confrontation Clause, absent "individualized
findings" of trauma. Id. Hence, the use of the screen could not qualify as a permissible
exception to the "irreducible literal meaning of the Clause: 'a right to meet face to face
all those who appear and give evidence at trial.' " Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
142. Id. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 1024-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The concurrence argued that certain
exceptions to a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause may be permissible:
"[O]ur precedents recognize a right to face-to-face confrontation at trial, but have never
viewed that right as absolute." Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Alluding to the Supreme Court precedent that
permitted limitations on face-to-face confrontation, Justice O'Connor wrote: "[I]f a court
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In 1990, just two years after Coy, the Supreme Court reexamined
whether there could be a permissible exception to the requirement of
face-to-face confrontation. In Maryland v. Craig,'4 5 the Court
evaluated a state statute that allowed the use of one-way closed-circuit
television to transmit the testimony of a child abuse victim from
outside the courtroom' 4 when "[t]he judge determines that tes-
timony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in the child
suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate."' 47 In Craig, the prosecution charged the
defendant, the owner of a preschool, with several sexual offenses
against a six-year-old child."4  Before trial, the prosecution
presented expert testimony that the alleged victim and several other
child witnesses would be unable to "reasonably communicate" in the
courtroom, and the trial proceeded with the use of closed-circuit
television. 49 The defendant was convicted, but the 'Court of Appeals
of Maryland reversed. 5'
In Craig, the majority opinion was written by Justice
O'Connor,' whose concurrence in Coy raised the possibility of
exceptions to an absolute requirement of face-to-face confron-
tation. 2  According to the Craig Court, "[t]he central concern of
the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."'153 This
"primary purpose" is served by the "elements of confron-
tation-physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation
of demeanor by the trier of fact.' ' 54 The inclusion of these elements
makes a case-specific finding of necessity, as is required by a number of state statutes,...
our cases suggest that the strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
146. Id at 840.
147. MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989).
148. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840.
149. Id. at 842-43.
150. Id. at 843. The court of appeals held that the prosecution failed to meet the "high
threshold"--established in Coy-of showing that the children's inability to communicate
was primarily the result of face-to-face confrontation. Id. (quoting Craig v. State, 560 A.2d
1120, 1121 (Md. 1989)). The Craig Court reversed the court of appeals to the extent that
it had overestimated the evidentiary requirements established by Coy. Id. at 857-60.
151. Id. at 840.
152. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's
rejection of a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Coy).
153. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845.
154. Id. at 846.
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of confrontation, moreover, satisfies the reliability prong of the
Roberts analysis.'55 The Court rejected the argument that face-to-
face confrontation is "the sine qua non of the confrontation right"'
5 6
by pointing to cases in which it had upheld the admissibility of
hearsay statements.5 7
The Craig opinion also dispensed with the "unavailability" prong
of the Roberts analysis; instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the
absence of face-to-face confrontation could be justified if "the
procedure is necessary to further an important state interest."' 58
According to Craig, the concurrence in Coy and the widespread
enactment of child shield statutes demonstrated that the state interest
in protecting child witnesses is sufficiently important to permit
testimony without face-to-face confrontation given an "adequate
showing of necessity."'59  Relying on documented evidence of
trauma to child witnesses in sexual abuse cases, the Court concluded
that case-specific findings of trauma in the presence of the defendant
satisfy the necessity requirement. 6°
Justice Scalia, the author of Coy, vehemently dissented in Craig,
arguing that the Confrontation Clause can be interpreted only by its
literal meaning: "[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee
reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were
thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was 'face
to face' confrontation.' 6' The dissent also rejected the majority's
implication that hearsay exceptions, based on unavailability of
witnesses, justify limitations on face-to-face confrontation: "[The]
155. Id. at 851-52; see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (describing the
analysis of the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Roberts).
156. Craig, 497 U.S. at 847.
157. id. at 848-49; see supra notes 111, 126 (summarizing Supreme Court decisions that
outlined the constitutional requirements for admitting hearsay statements).
158. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852; see infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (highlighting
the increasing public awareness of child sexual abuse trials).
159. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853-55; see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 607-09 (1982) (finding that protection of a minor victim's psychological and physical
well-being was a state interest that could justify excluding the press and the public from
attending a trial). But see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1974) (holding that a
state court's protective order prohibiting cross-examination of a juvenile witness about his
criminal record violated the defendant's right to confrontation).
160. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856-57. The Court declined to "establish, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, any such categorical evidentiary prerequisites for the use of the one-way
television procedure." Id. at 860.
161. I& at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the original intent of the
Confrontation Clause governs a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights: " '[T]o confront'
plainly means to encounter face to face, whatever else it may mean in addition." Id. at
864 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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unwillingness [to testify in the presence of the defendant] cannot be
a valid excuse under the Confrontation Clause, whose very object is
to place the witness under the sometimes hostile glare of the
defendant."'6
The Craig decision softened the blow dealt to child shield statutes
by Coy and restored the protected status of child sexual abuse
witnesses. Craig approved the use of alternatives to face-to-face
confrontation"6 when the prosecution can demonstrate a par-
ticularized showing of trauma to the witness in the presence of the
defendant. 6' Ultimately, the Craig decision signified the Supreme
Court's willingness to limit the protections granted to defendants by
the Confrontation Clause and the other provisions of the Sixth
Amendment.16
162. Id. at 866 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited numerous studies that
questioned the reliability of testimony by child witnesses. Id. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The dissent cited evidence of suggestibility, poor memory, and exaggeration, id. at 868-69
(Scalia, J. dissenting), to demonstrate "[t]he value of the confrontation right in guarding
against a child's distorted or coerced recollections," id. at 869 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of the reliability of child witnesses, see infra note 215.
163. The method for receiving testimony is typically specified by a state statute that
authorizes protection of child witnesses. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie
1988 & Supp. 1994); see also supra note 129 (quoting the pertinent Virginia law in effect
at the time of the Fields trial). In 1991, Congress adopted the Craig criteria when it
enacted the Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights (CVCWR) statute as part of the
Crime Control Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 225, 104 Stat. 4789, 4798-4805 (1990)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994)). The legislation permits the use of
closed-circuit television in federal courts for receiving testimony and taking depositions
from a child who witnessed a crime against another person or who has been a victim of
physical or sexual abuse. Id.
164. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856-57.
165. The Craig decision reflects the Supreme Court's thinking on the scope of the
federal Confrontation Clause. However, many state constitutions explicitly require face-to-
face confrontation between defendant and witnesses. For example, in Commonwealth v.
Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the state
constitution required a literal "face-to-face" confrontation between the defendant and the
witnesses. ld. at 284-85. The same result was realized in People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d
685, 688-89 (Ill. 1994), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down a state child
shield statute because "the Illinois Constitution confers an express and unqualified right
to a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses." Id. at 687. However, in November 1994,
less than nine months after the Fitzpatrick decision was announced, the Illinois
Constitution's Confrontation Clause was amended by popular vote. See Thomas Conklin,
Note, People v. Fitzpatrick. The Path to Amending the Illinois Constitution to Protect
Child Witnesses in Criminal Sexual Abuse Cases, 26 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 321, 322-23 (1995).
The amendment adopted language that was nearly identical to that of the Confrontation
Clause in the United States Constitution, thereby negating the decision in Fitzpatrick. See
id. at 323.
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The Fourth Circuit's two-part decision in Fields relies on two of
the Supreme Court's principal Sixth Amendment decisions166 in
examining a defendant's right to defend himself pro se in a child
sexual abuse trial. The first tier of the Fourth Circuit's decision
focuses strictly on the standard under which the Faretta right must be
invoked.67 Little dispute exists among the federal circuit courts
regarding the articulated standard for a defendant to invoke the right
to self-representation."6  Despite the uniform standard for exer-
cising the Faretta right, however, the federal circuit courts have
adopted varied interpretations on the extent to which a defendant's
behavior at trial conforms with the Faretta criteria. 69 Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit's analysis is consistent with the general reluctance
of appellate courts to reverse trial court denials of requests for self-
representation. 7 ' Applying the "question of fact" standard of
review, the Fields court accorded a " 'high measure of
deference' ""' to the trial court's refusal to allow Fields to proceed
without counsel."v
166. The Fields opinion examined the right to self-representation under Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and the effect of the Confrontation Clause in a sexual
abuse trial under Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Fields, 49 F.3d at 1028-37.
167. In the first part of Fields, the Fourth Circuit upheld the state court's determination
that Fields never declared his desire to represent himself "clearly and unequivocally."
Fields, 49 F.3d at 1034. Hence, his attempt to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro
se did not meet the threshold established in the wake of Fareta. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text. The first part of the opinion thus resolved the issue on appeal.
According to the dissent, the second part of the majority opinion, addressing the scope of
Fields's Sixth Amendment right of self-representation, "borders on dicta." Fields, 49 F.3d
at 1045 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
168. A defendant intending to proceed pro se must "clearly and unequivocally" waive
the right to counsel and "knowingly and intelligently" declare his desire to represent
himself. See, e.g., Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1989); Tuitt v. Fair,
822 F.2d 166, 174-75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987).
169. See Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444-45 (holding that a "conditional" request for self-
representation was not equivocal); cf. United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298-99 (4th
Cir.) (holding that a defendant may invite counsel to participate during certain stages of
trial and still effectively invoke the right to self-representation), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1107
(1985).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504,1510-11 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the defendant's request to proceed pro se after trial commenced was properly denied);
McNamara v. Riddle, 563 F.2d 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the defendant's
implied request to dispense with counsel and proceed pro se was properly disregarded by
the trial court).
171. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983)).
172. The majority opinion's analysis, based on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988), reviewed the
trial court's denial under a "presumption of correctness." Fields, 49 F.3d at 1032-33; see
supra note 34 (discussing the majority's standard of review).
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The opinion also highlighted the uniqueness of the right to self-
representation. As Faretta recognized, the right of a defendant to
proceed pro se is implicit in the structure of the Sixth
Amendment.73 Yet, the goal of the Faretta decision 74-- to
guarantee that a criminal defendant has a personal defense-must co-
exist with the constitutional entitlement to proceed with counsel, even
though the two rights are mutually exclusive.17 Because the
granting of a request for self-representation is within the trial court's
discretion,176 defendants may perceive it as a privilege rather than a
constitutional guarantee. 77  Conversely, protection of the right to
counsel is not discretionary; it is in force until the defendant effec-
tively waives it. 78 The difficulty faced by trial judges in protecting
both rights was predicted in Faretta by the dissents of Chief Justice
Burger179  and Justice Blackmun.'80  These sentiments
173. See supra note 3 (describing the constitutional analysis in Faretta).
174. The Faretta Court concluded that "[t]he language and spirit of the Sixth
Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the
Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed
between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally." Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
175. See Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir.) (holding that a defendant cannot
refuse to waive the right to counsel while attempting to proceed pro se), cert denied, 484
U.S. 945 (1987).
176. See. Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 941 (4th Cir. 1990) (declaring that the
right to self-representation is not absolute), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 (1991).
177. See Joan W. Garrott, The Constitutional Right of Self-Representation: Faretta and
the "Assistance of Counsel", 3 PEPP. L. REv. 336,338 (1976) (stating that at early common
law, a defendant's only "right" was the "privilege" of self-representation that enabled him
to respond to accusations and evidence against him); supra note 78 (outlining the historical
recognition of the right to self-representation).
178. See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (holding
that the right to assistance of counsel is effective until waived, while the right to self-
representation is not in effect until it is asserted).
179. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger's concern for just convictions led him to conclude that "there is nothing
desirable or useful in permitting every accused person, even the most uneducated and
inexperienced, to insist upon conducting his own defense to criminal charges." Id. (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger advocated that, absent a statutory right to self-
representation, trial courts should have discretion to require representation by counsel if
the interests of justice require it. Id. at 836 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The system of
criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction." Id. at 840
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
180. Ld. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was disturbed by the
potential for misuse of the Faretta right:
I cannot agree that there is anything in the Due Process Clause or the Sixth
Amendment that requires the States to subordinate the solemn business of
conducting a criminal prosecution to the whimsical-albeit voluntary-caprice of
every accused who wishes to use his trial as a vehicle for personal or political
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
foreshadowed the modem judiciary's paternalistic protection of
defendants.
In fact, Fields comports with Fourth Circuit precedent'81 that
parallels the state of Sixth Amendment law prior to Faretta.'"
Despite the mandate of Faretta, concerns for fairness to the defendant
and the criminal justice process have led trial courts to impose a
heavy burden on defendants who desire to waive the right to counsel
and proceed pro se."8 Similarly, as the dissent in Fields argued,
courts may hesitate to grant requests for self-representation because
they dislike the consequences of allowing a defendant to present a pro
se defense, including the defendant's personal confrontation of
witnesses."8 In a larger sense, the results in Fields and similar cases
beg the question of what Faretta gained for pro se defendants.
In the second tier of the Fields opinion, the Fourth Circuit held
that Fields was not entitled to self-representation because he merely
sought the opportunity to cross-examine his accusers.' The court
concluded that Fields did not desire any of the other benefits to which
he was entitled as a pro se defendant.8 6 In reaching its conclusion,
self-gratification.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. In its analysis of the rights to counsel and self-representation, the Fields court
concluded that " '[o]f the two [rights], the right to be represented by counsel is
preeminent.' " Fields, 49 F.3d at 1028 (quoting United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559
(4th Cir. 1985)). But see Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
"the two rights are equivalent").
182. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,69 (1932) (noting that even an intelligent
and educated criminal defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him").
183. See, e.g., Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that when the two
rights collide, favoring the right to counsel over the right to self-representation is
reasonable because denial of the right to counsel "leaves the average defendant helpless").
184. The Fields dissent criticized the majority's motives in denying the request for self-
representation: "The fact that this court does not like the consequences flowing from an
application of a defendant's.., rights does not justify its taking a defendant's request to
represent himself any less seriously." Fields, 49 F.3d at 1044 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1034-37. Chief Judge Ervin, dissenting in Fields, rejected the majority's
analysis of the facts as well as the law. Id at 1042 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
argued that in his three letters and at the pretrial hearing, Fields demonstrated more than
simply a desire to cross-examine the witnesses. Id. at 1042-44 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
Rather, in Chief Judge Ervin's view, Fields became dissatisfied with his attorneys' defense
strategy and competence, and expressed his displeasure to the trial judge. Id. Under this
analysis, Fields was entitled to the Faretta guarantee: "To thrust counsel upon the accused,
against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the [Sixth] Amendment." Faretta,
422 U.S. at 820.
186. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1037; see supra note'39 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's analysis of Fields's defense strategy).
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the court applied a three-step syllogism. First, the majority found
that, although the defendant effectively invoked his right to self-
representation, he had done so only to cross-examine the child
witnesses." Second, applying the reasoning of Maryland v.
Craig'88 to Fields by analogy, the majority concluded that the
defendant was not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses.'89 Third,
because the defendant's sole purpose in representing himself was not
protected under the Sixth Amendment, the trial court committed no
error in denying the defendant's request for self-representation. 90
Unlike the first part of the majority opinion, which rejected the
defendant's request to defend pro se based on precedent aimed at
protecting defendants,' the second part of Fields denied the
request after applying a two-pronged analysis enunciated in Craig that
ultimately favors protection of child witnesses."
187. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1034. The court assumed for the purpose of argument in the
second tier that this invocation was effective, even though the court had ruled to the
contrary in the first part of the opinion. Id. In response, the dissent termed the majority's
analysis under Craig an "alternative" holding that was "not necessary for the proper
resolution of the case." Id. at 1044 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
188. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). The Fourth Circuit extracted two primary requirements from
the Craig opinion and applied them to the facts in Fields. First, while Craig required
assuring the reliability of testimony from witnesses who were not subjected to face-to-face
confrontation, id. at 850, the Fields court found that the purpose of the self-representation
right would be "otherwise assured" by allowing a pro se defendant to conduct all of the
other components of his defense. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1035. Fields held that the defendant's
" 'dignity and autonomy' " would be affirmed and that he would still be able to present
his " 'best possible defense.' " Id (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-78
(1984)); see supra note 96. Second, Craig held that restricting face-to-face confrontation
could be justified only when it was necessary to further an important state interest, such
as the protection of child witnesses. 497 U.S. at 850, 855. Applying this analysis, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the restriction of the right to personal cross-examination was
justified. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036; see supra note 44 and accompanying text (summarizing
the Craig analysis and its application in Fields).
189. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1035-37. The majority held that denying the request to cross-
examine the witnesses personally survived constitutional scrutiny because the purpose of
the self-representation right-to affirm the defendant's dignity and autonomy-would have
been otherwise assured, and denial of the request was necessary to further an important
public policy. Id.; see supra note 188.
190. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1034. But see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984)
(noting that denial of self-representation "is not amenable to 'harmless error' analysis.
The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless").
191. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (describing the criteria for evaluating
a defendant's request for self-representation).
192. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Despite the majority's reliance on
Craig, the cases are distinguishable in two significant aspects. First, Fields dealt with a
child sexual abuse trial in which the defendant requested to represent himself. Fields, 49
F.3d at 1025-28. In contrast, Craig discussed the limitation on a defendant's right to face-
to-face cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause. Craig, 497 U.S. at 843. Hence,
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The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Fields cited two supporting
decisions reached in state courts, in part to demonstrate the impor-
tance of the state interest in protecting child witnesses.193 In 1989
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a pro se defendant in
a child abuse case did not have a constitutional right to question the
child victim personally following a showing of probable harm to the
child during cross-examination. 4 The Rhode Island court, like the
Fourth Circuit in Fields, strongly opposed the possibility of
traumatizing the children.'95 Similarly, in State v. Estabrook'96 the
Court of Appeals of Washington upheld the conviction of a pro se
defendant who was required to submit his questions for cross-
examination to be read by the judge.Y Estabrook provided support
for the Fourth Circuit's opinion because the defendant personally
conducted all other major components of his defense, thereby
retaining the "dignity and autonomy" ensured by Faretta"'
The majority's two alternative bases for decision in Fields
illuminate the Fourth Circuit's view of the Sixth Amendment.'99
Under the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Craig that upheld restrictions on face-to-face confrontation formed
the Fields decision extends the reach of the Craig decision beyond the scope of
confrontation rights to the right to self-representation under Faretta. Furthermore, the
Craig opinion allowed the use of cross-examination by closed-circuit television only upon
a particularized showing of trauma to the child witness. Id. at 855-56. Conversely, the
Fields majority asserted that "we do not believe it was essential in this case that
psychological evidence of the probable emotional harm to each of the girls be presented
in order for the trial court to find that denying Fields personal cross-examination was
necessary to protect them." Fields, 49 F.3d at 1037. Therefore, the Fields decision
presumes that personal cross-examination of child witnesses by their alleged abusers will
cause emotional harm that satisfies the Craig requirement of a particularized showing. But
see Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 570 N.E.2d 1384, 1390-91 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a
trial judge's belief that face-to-face cross-examination by a pro se defendant would
traumatize a child witness, without an actual finding of trauma, was insufficient to justify
restrictions on the self-representation right).
193. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036 (citing State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 454 (R.I. 1989) and
State v. Estabrook, 842 P.2d 1001, 1004-06 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 854 P.2d 1084
(Wash. 1993)).
194. Taylor, 562 A.2d at 454 ("In a case where a defendant states at an early date and
in an unequivocal manner that he or she wishes to proceed pro se, standby counsel will
be appointed to conduct the examination of the child victim.").
195. Id. at 452-54.
196. 842 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 854 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1993).
197. Id. at 1004-06.
198. Id at 1006.
199. The dissent was "disturbed by the court's decision to use this case as the vehicle
by which it could reconsider the scope of the Sixth Amendment's right to self-represen-
tation." Fields, 49 F.3d at 1044 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
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the foundation for restrictions on the right to self-representation.'
The majority applied the Craig reasoning directly to the Fields case:
"If a defendant's Confrontation Clause right can be limited in the
manner provided in Craig, we have little doubt that a defendant's self-
representation right can be similarly limited."' This analysis
suggests that the Craig analysis may be a model for evaluating
restrictions on other Sixth Amendment rights.
Despite the strong urging by the majority to protect the child
witnesses from trauma,' the dissent rejected the extension of Craig
to the Fields case. 3 According to the dissent, the Fields opinion
"collapsed the distinction between rights under the Confrontation
Clause and the right to self-representation."2' Hence, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion diminished the uniqueness of the Faretta right to
self-representation by equating it with the explicit provisions under
the Sixth Amendment.2 5 According to the dissent, the logic behind
the specific restriction of the right to self-representation involved in
Fields-based on analogy to Craig-also marked a significant
extension of federal court precedent. For example, it is true that the
various circuit courts have consistently held that restrictions could be
placed on pro se litigants to avoid delays 6 or to prevent an unruly
defendant's behavior from interfering with normal judicial
procedures.' Similarly, the constitutional right to self-represen-
tation is not guaranteed on appeal because the right to appeal itself,
200. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (describing the Fourth Circuit's
application of a two-pronged test from Craig to the facts in Fields).
201. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1035. The dissent disagreed, stating that "[t]he majority's most
significant mistake is assuming that the self-representation right described in Faretta and
Wiggins and the Confrontation Clause right analyzed in Craig are based on similar
concerns." ld. at 1046 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1036. The majority's analysis of Fields and Craig led it to conclude that "the
State had an extremely important interest in preventing Fields from personally cross-
examining the young girls here." Id.
203. Id at 1046 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1045 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
205. See supra note 3 (describing the origin of the implicit right to self-representation
within the structure of the Sixth Amendment).
206. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Groose, 28 F.3d 859,862 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming the denial
of a writ of habeas corpus to a defendant who requested waiver of counsel when "only
three weeks remained before the scheduled trial date, and the trial court, the state, and
[defendant's counsel] were prepared to begin"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 741 (1995).
207. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,834 n.46 (1975). Faretta makes clear that "[t]he
right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom." Id. For
a comparison of self-representation in criminal and civil cases, see Julie M. Bradlow,
Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1988).
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unlike the constitutional right to trial, is granted only by statute. °"
In Fields, however, the dissent argued that the Fourth Circuit reached
a new level of scrutiny for reviewing a defendant's request for self-
representation.0 In the future, a trial court following Fields may
probe into the strategy of the pro se defendant and, in some cases,
reject the strategy and consequently the request to proceed pro se.
The result would contravene the Faretta right to make a personal
defense21° even if the pro se defense strategy was flawed and the
assistance of counsel was advantageous to the defendant.
The court's opinion reflects a concern among the judiciary for
eliciting testimony from child victims of sexual abuse.2 ' Given the
particularly abhorrent nature of the crime of child sexual abuse and
the difficulties in prosecuting cases effectively,212 legislatures and
courts have responded with somewhat liberalized prosecutorial
techniques213 in order to effectuate presentation of the children's
statements, 2 4 even though some researchers question the scientific
208. United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559-60 (4th Cir. 1985).
209. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1044 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting). The dissent asserted the
importance of protecting the right to self-representation for all criminal defendants: "[The
right to proceed pro se] is particularly important, not only to the defendant... but also
to our system of justice as a whole, which is made less fair by telling some defendants that
they may not serve as their own defense." Id. at 1047 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
210. See supra text accompanying note 79 (highlighting the defendant's basic right to
defend himself recognized in Faretta).
211. See supra note 23 (describing the trial judge's rejection of Fields's request to
conduct his own defense).
212. Despite the availability of alternative evidentiary methods, several high-profile
child sexual abuse cases have resulted in acquittals or reversed convictions. The McMartin
preschool case in California ended in acquittals seven years after charges were filed.
Malcolm Gladwell, Children's Testimony No Longer Gospel in Day-Care Abuse Cases,
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1995, at A3. The North Carolina Court of Appeals granted a new
trial to Robert Kelly, Jr., who was convicted of 99 sexual offenses in the "Little Rascals"
case. State v. Kelly, 118 N.C. App. 589, 5992 456 S.E.2d 861, 869, disc. rev. denied, 341
N.C. 422, 461 S.E.2d 764 (1995). The court of appeals held, inter alia, that the opinion
testimony of the victims' parents included behavioral observations that are admissible only
when presented by expert testimony. Id. at 594-97, 456 S.E.2d at 866-68.
213. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. (summarizing modified procedures to
cross-examine child witnesses among Fourth Circuit states); see also FED R. EVID. 611(c)
(permitting leading questions on direct examination when necessary to develop testimony);
United States v. Nabors, 762 F.2d 642, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1985) (allowing prosecutor to use
leading questions to prompt a response from a reluctant child witness).
214. After concluding that Fields's right to self-representation had been denied, the
dissent discussed the possibility of protecting the child witnesses:
The trial court properly could employ special procedures that preserve the core
right of the defendant to conduct his own defense while adequately protecting the
welfare of the child witnesses. Among the procedures from which the trial court
could choose ... would be: installing a screen or other barrier between the
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basis and effectiveness of alternative methods of questioning.215 The
Supreme Court has provided little guidance on the subject of a
defendant's right to confrontation in child sexual abuse cases. In
particular, the contrary positions taken by Justice Scalia in Coy and
Justice O'Connor in Craig reflect the Court's tendency toward a hair-
splitting constitutional analysis of the Confrontation Clause.216 The
Supreme Court's two-pronged analysis enunciated in Craig21 7-and
defendant and the witnesses; conducting closed sessions out of the courtroom;
placing the defendant and the witnesses in separate rooms; requiring the
defendant to submit his questions to the judge who, after scanning them, would
read them aloud to the witnesses; and requiring the defendant to remain seated
at counsel table while questioning the witnesses.
Fields, 49 F.3d at 1047 n.4 (Ervin, CJ., dissenting). The majority would have allowed
Fields to write out questions for cross-examination and then submit them to the court to
be read by his attorney. Id. at 1034.
215. Leading experts in the field of child behavior in legal proceedings have questioned
the presumption that "greater testimonial accuracy will result from modifications in
courtroom interviewing.... [W]ithout exception this presumption has never been
empirically satisfied." Stephen J. Ceci & Eduardus de Bruyn, Child Witnesses in Court"
A Growing Dilemma, CHILDREN TODAY, Jan. 1993, at 6. For a thorough analysis of
contemporary psychological insight into the role of child witnesses, see, e.g., LUCY S.
MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 169
(1994) (arguing that in the wake of conflicting empirical data, "[w]e simply do not know
if shielding produces as reliable or more reliable evidence from a child witness[]"); INGER
J. SAGATUN & LEONARD P. EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 184
(1995) (asserting that children may be traumatized by testifying in a courtroom setting, not
simply by the presence of a defendant); Stephen J. Ceci, Cognitive and Social Factors in
Children's Testimony, in PSYCHOLOGY IN LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION 1, 44 (Bruce D.
Sales & Gary R. VandenBos eds., 1994) (concluding that "[tihe majority of children are
neither as hypersuggestible and coachable as some pro-defense advocates have alleged nor
are they as resistant to suggestions about their own bodies as some pro-prosecution
advocates have claimed").
216. One commentator has argued that piecemeal analysis of the Confrontation Clause
symbolizes a troubling trend in constitutional law:
[T]he particular guarantees of the amendments have been studied in a
fragmented manner that obscures the grand design of the Bill of Rights and its
relationship to the Constitution .... Moreover, by focusing on the parts more
than on the whole, we have lost sight of the Bill of Rights as a political document
with a principal objective of restraining the power of the government vis-a-vis the
individual.
Berger, supra note 103, at 560-61.
217. See, e.g., Robert H. King, Jr., The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution
Should the Bill of Rights Be Transformed into the Bill of Preferences?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
49, 86 (1992) (describing the Craig analysis as a hybrid of a "middle" level scrutiny test
and the "general approach" hearsay test of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). One
commentator has remarked that the Craig opinion advocates "ad hoc balancing" in which
the trial court must reconcile "all of the rights and interests presented in the particular
case." David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests:
Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1538 (1992).
Conversely, Justice Scalia's dissent in Craig favored a "categorical mode of adjudication"
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adopted in Fields-has received much scholarly criticism because it
diverges from the Court's previous decisions on restrictions on
fundamental constitutional rights.218 Hence, exposure of these
weaknesses in Craig leaves Fields open to similar attacks.
A more thorough approach to the issues in Fields would have
included a discussion of the goal of fairness which the adversarial
process seeks to ensure. In attempting to present legal arguments
that embody the trial judge's instinctive aversion to face-to-face cross-
examination by the defendant in Fields,219 the Fourth Circuit's
opinion overlooks the fact that the defendant's desire to cross-
examine his accusers may be objectionable in layman's terms. Cross-
examination enables a criminal defendant to attack the human
components of the prosecution's case-in-chief through in-
timidation.2 In certain cases, however, the intimidation of the
witness during cross-examination and the tactical advantage gained by
it may exceed what fundamental fairness in the adversarial process
requires-and the Bill of Rights guarantees-to satisfy the defendant's
right to confrontation. Ultimately, the Fields court could have
remained faithful to Craig and Faretta by exploring the alternative but
in its absolute form, under which the meaning of the constitutional provision is fixed and
the government's interest in restricting a right is irrelevant. Id. at 1535-36. The two
approaches to Craig are at opposite ends of the spectrum of constitutional methods. Id.
at 1538.
218. See King, supra note 217, at 84-87 (arguing that the Supreme Court should have
applied a strict scrutiny analysis under which the Court ordinarily allows a state's
restriction of a fundamental right when the restriction is necessary to further a compelling
interest and the state has chosen the least restrictive means of promoting the compelling
interest); see also Beckett, supra note 111, at 1642 (arguing that an "original intent"
analysis should be applied to all cases involving restriction of Confrontation Clause rights);
Brent J. Fields, Maryland v. Craig: The Constitutionality of Closed Circuit Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 25 GA. L. REV. 167, 191-93 (1990) (concluding that the Craig
Court should have applied the two-pronged test from Roberts in order to reach the same
result). For a detailed critique of the Craig decision within a cost-benefit framework, see
Peter T. Wendel, A Law and Economics Analysis of the Right to Face-to-Face Confron-
tation Post-Maryland v. Craig: Distinguishing the Forest from the Trees, 22 HoFSTRA L,
REV. 405, 489-91 (1993) (arguing that Craig rejects the traditional assumption that the
benefits of face-to-face confrontation outweigh its costs).
219. See supra note 23 (summarizing the trial court's rejection of Fields's request for
self-representation).
220. See ROBERT E. GOLDMAN, THE MODERN ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION § 8.2
(1993) (arguing that intimidation allows the cross-examiner to maintain an advantage by
exerting control over a witness already threatened by unfamiliar surroundings). Similarly,
the Supreme Court has argued that cross-examination is the " 'greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.' " California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)
(quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
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pragmatic methods of cross-examination proposed by the dissent."'
Unfortunately, the court resorted to an unnecessary dismantling of the
Faretta right of self-representation.
As a consequence of the broadly-worded Fields decision, it
appears that the Fourth Circuit has opened a doorway toward further
erosion of the Faretta right and of the Sixth Amendment
provisions.'m The most troubling legacy of Fields is the court's
revelation of a hierarchy of Sixth Amendment rights' that plainly
contradicts the goal of Faretta. 4  As the dissent noted, "the
majority gives insufficient respect to the self-representation right,
ignoring the historical underpinnings of the right as discussed in
Faretta."'  Perhaps this subordination of the right of self-represen-
tation to enforcement of the right to counsel is rooted in the common
experience of the judiciary which observes the prosecution and
conviction of defendants in unfamiliar and unfriendly courtroom
settings. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Faretta, in which he
predicted the erosion of explicit Sixth Amendment rights due to
exercise of the implicit right to self-representation,' 6 has advanced
one step further in Fields. In the Fourth Circuit, trial courts can limit
both explicit and implicit Sixth Amendment rights.
As a result of Fields, trial courts within the Fourth Circuit are
now on notice that, for the purposes of Sixth Amendment provisions,
pro se defendants in sexual abuse cases are a class unto themselves.
By upholding the broad discretionary powers granted to trial judges
in adjudicating sexual abuse cases,2' the court demonstrated its
agreement with the public outcry for expedited convictions of sexual
abuse defendants. Yet in its desire to prevent emotional trauma to
221. See supra note 214 (describing the dissent's proposed techniques for cross-
examination of child witnesses in Fields).
222. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, relying principally on Fields, denied a pro
se litigant the right to cross-examine witnesses personally during a child custody
proceeding. In re Adoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d 653, 661-62 (N.D. 1995). There is no
constitutional right to either the assistance of counsel or self-representation in a state civil
trial. See Bradlow, supra note 207, at 669-71. Nevertheless, this case suggests that the
potential reach of Fields may be broad.
223. "While the Confrontation Clause right is guaranteed explicitly in the Sixth
Amendment,.. . the self-representation right is only implicit in that Amendment." Fields,
49 F.3d at 1035 (emphasis added). See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 3 (discussing the unique status of the Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation).
225. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1045 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
226. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 838-40 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
227. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1033.
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the child witnesses in sexual abuse cases,' the Fields court
seemingly extinguished many of the pro se defendant's rights that
were recognized in Faretta and enumerated in Wiggins. '
Along with its direct impact on child sexual abuse cases, the
analysis of the right to self-representation presented in Fields may
extend to other areas of criminal law. The protection of child
witnesses serves many purposes, including the protection of the
emotional well-being of the witnesses and the elicitation of accurate
testimony. These same objectives would seemingly apply in other
criminal cases in which a prior relationship between the defendant
and the witness, coupled with an allegation of criminal activity, could
exacerbate the process of testifying in court. For example, victims of
rape or domestic violence may demand the same consideration as
child sexual abuse victims; 0 thus, a pro se defendant in such cases,
while clearly beyond the scope of Craig restrictions on confrontation,
could be affected by the holding in Fields. Without a clear mandate
from legislatures or additional direction from the Supreme Court, the
protection of defendants and witnesses remains primarily within the
discretionary powers of trial courts. Yet the Fields decision tilts the
balance away from the defendant's ability to make his personal
defense, even though the Sixth Amendment and Faretta guarantee
that right. Despite its laudable policy goals, this result jeopardizes the
Sixth Amendment protections that all criminal defendants possess.
WILLIAM . LANE
228. IdL at 1036.
229. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (listing the specific rights of a criminal
defendant who conducts his own defense).
230. See FED. R. EVID. 412 (establishing "rape shield" evidentiary provisions to protect
victims of sexual misconduct from invasion of privacy).
[Vol. 74
